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Abstract—In recent years, cloud database storage has become 
an inexpensive and convenient option for businesses and 
individuals to store information. While its positive aspects make 
the cloud extremely attractive for data storage, it is a relatively 
new area of service, making it vulnerable to cyber-attacks and 
security breaches. Storing data in a foreign location also requires 
the owner to relinquish control of their information to system 
administrators of these online database services. This opens the 
possibility for malicious, internal attacks on the data that may 
involve the manipulation, omission, or addition of data. The 
retention of the data as it was intended to be stored is referred to 
as the database’s integrity. Our research tests a potential solution 
for maintaining the integrity of these cloud-storage databases by 
converting the original databases to Integrity Coded Databases 
(ICDB). ICDBs utilize Integrity Codes: cryptographic codes 
created alongside the data by a private key that only the data 
owner has access to. When the database is queried, an integrity 
code is returned along with the queried information. The owner is 
then able to verify that the information is correct, complete, and 
fresh. Consequently, ICDBs also incur performance and memory 
penalties. In our research, we explore, test, and benchmark ICDBs 
to determine the costs and benefits of maintaining an ICDB versus 
a standard database. 
Keywords—Data; Integrity Code; Integrity Coded Database; 
Verification 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud database storage is enticing for information storage as 
it allows customers to pay a flat, recurring rate rather than 
purchasing the necessary equipment and hiring professionals to 
create, update, and maintain a local database [10]. The 
convenience of outsourcing database management to the cloud 
comes with the potential of malicious attacks however, both 
from internal and external sources [11]. A customer must trust 
that the hosting company has taken the proper measures to 
defend against outside cyber-attacks and also that the company 
insiders will not attempt to manipulate the data contained within 
the database [11]. 
A. Database Integrity 
One approach to ensure database integrity is to utilize an 
Integrity Coded Database (ICDB). This paper will make 
extensive references to Boise State University Professor Jyh-
haw Yeh’s paper on ICDBs: “Protecting Data Freshness and 
Correctness for Outsourced Databases in Clouds” [3]. It is 
highly recommended to read the main implementation model in 
the document, as this paper will provide real-world data on the 
basic implementation. 
By converting a database to an ICDB, the data owner is able 
to verify that their queried information’s integrity is preserved. 
An ICDB’s defining feature is that it contains Integrity Codes, 
cryptographic codes that are stored alongside a unit of data in 
the database [3]. The integrity codes are generated using a 
cryptographic function by using database data  as an input, and  
is encrypted with a key that only the database owner has access 
to. When an ICDB is queried, the queried data is fetched along 
with the corresponding integrity code. Use of the private key 
allows the database owner to verify that the information returned 
by their query matches the expected return information. If either 
the data or the code is manipulated, the data owner will be able 
to detect these changes [3]. 
In order to guarantee integrity, the following criteria should 
be enforced [3]: 
• Correctness: Returned data should be original, and not 
forged. 
• Freshness: Returned data should be current and not 
include previously removed data. 
• Completeness: All matched data should be returned. 
ICDBs seek to maintain integrity by avoiding: 
• Data Manipulation: The alteration of data in the 
database or in the returned values. 
• Data Omission: Deletion of data in the database or 
omission of information in the returned values. 
• Data Addition: Insertion of data in the database or 
addition of information in the returned values. 
• Stale Data: Returning old data or data previously 
removed from the database. 
This document will only be focused on avoiding data 
manipulation, data addition and stale data. As explained in 
Yeh’s paper [3], it is very difficult to ensure data completeness, 
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 and as such the ICDB model implementations in this document 
will only concentrate on ensuring correctness and freshness. 
B. Database Evaluation 
Although ICDBs are able to detect malicious behavior, they 
come with a cost. An ICDB will incur memory penalties for 
storing integrity codes, and performance penalties for creating 
and returning the codes along with the data. Introducing an 
additional piece of information to accompany each value in a 
database increases query time and is detrimental to the overall 
access and retrieval speed of data. To determine the extent to 
which the level of efficiency decreases, tests will be performed 
on three different databases implemented with the MySQL open 
source database management software [1] and will be testing 
different benchmarks with the MySQLSlap and MySQL 
Workbench add-on tools [2]. MySQL is a popular, and provides 
a wide array of tools and available plugins for additional 
features. 
This research project will be specifically concerned with the 
following tests: 
• Verification: Does the introduction of integrity codes 
reliably detect when data is altered, moved, deleted, or 
when it is stale? 
• Memory Usage: How much additional memory is 
required to store integrity codes? 
• Data Conversion and Retrieval Time: How quickly 
can data be converted, retrieved, and verified? 
Each of these criteria will be tested by creating a copy of a 
standard database, converting it to an ICDB, and then running 
tests on both the DB and the ICDB databases in order to compare 
results. 
This paper has been organized into eight sections. Section II 
details similar related work, Section 0 presents the encryption 
process used in generating integrity codes, section IV introduces 
implementation of ICDB models, section V outlines the specific 
testing implementation process, section VI reports results of 
testing, section VII explains possible threats to validity and 
lastly our conclusions will be reported in section VIII. We have 
also provided Acknowledgements, References, and an 
Appendix at the end of this document. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Protecting Data Freshness and Correctness for 
Outsourced Databases in Clouds 
This project's primary focus is to provide results for Dr. Jyh-
haw Yeh’s paper on integrity coded databases [3]. The paper 
outlines the implementation of an ICDB using the RSA 
algorithm to generate integrity codes, one code per field. More 
explanation on specific implementation will be given in the next 
section. 
B. Database Security: What Students Need to Know 
Meg Coffin Murray discusses database security and methods 
by which to improve it [6]. The paper does not delve deeply into 
database protection from external sources but instead focuses on 
database security in internal affairs. The discussed method in the 
paper is to use access control. Different forms of access control 
allow management to control who has access to what parts of 
the database. This helps to prevent private data being released 
and also reduces unwanted changes to the database, by only 
giving certain users the privilege of reading or writing to 
particular parts the databases. The second form of security 
discussed is audit logs. Audit logs store information on what has 
been accessed and changed and by whom, so that activities are 
able to be monitored. Both access control management and 
storage of database modifications are important to our ICDB 
research as they directly relate to the database owner's ability to 
ensure the integrity of their information. While access control is 
relevant, modification logging is invaluable in allowing the 
database owner to track potential malicious attacks on data.  
C. Database Security Threats and Challenges in Database 
Forensic: Survey 
[5] explores ways of detecting when a database has been 
attacked or manipulated, most notably through the use of audit 
logs and audit databases. The audits save information regarding 
who has accessed the database and what actions they performed. 
The logs and databases themselves are also protected to prevent 
prohibited modifications, removal, or corruption of the 
information they hold. This allows for quick tracking of 
individuals who have accessed a database without authorization. 
Audit databases also give database owners  information on what 
was accessed or changed by the unauthorized individual. 
The problem with this method is that it adds more elements 
to the infrastructure that require protection from unwanted 
modifications. The audit logs are able to detect changes in the 
database but must also be able to detect changes in themselves. 
They must also be able to protect themselves from unwanted 
modification, or else detecting the changes would prove 
fruitless.  
D. Hybrid Encryption for Cloud Database Security 
In 2012, Kaur and Bhardwaj from Punjab University 
conducted research on how to secure data in cloud-stored 
databases. Their research paper, “Hybrid Encryption for Cloud 
Database Security” [4] presents a new methodology for 
encrypting data in the cloud. The proposed solution involves 
chunking the data in the database and implementing three unique 
encryption techniques to secure the data. The data is secured by 
each form of encryption by requiring a different key to access 
the database information. Because of the difficulty involved in 
reversing one RSA encryption algorithm, having three layers 
would be incredibly cumbersome for a hacker to decrypt. 
Although a multi-level encryption scheme would bolster the 
defenses of an ICDB, it would likely come with a dramatic cost 
in terms of efficiency and overall performance of the database. 
Because efficiency and performance are of major concern in our 
research, we have chosen to test the ICDBs with only one of 
three cryptographic schemes at a time: RSA, Hashing, or AES. 
These schemes will be discussed in more detail in the following 
section. 
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SCHEMES 
Three different cryptographic schemes for verifying 
database integrity are provided in this document. They are RSA, 
 Hashing, and AES. Each offers a unique approach to verify data 
integrity, and each has its own set of strengths and weaknesses. 
A. RSA Encryption 
Most of the emphasis is on RSA public-key encryption. 
Because we have been given completed modules to test and 
benchmark different aspects of an ICDB, this implementation 
will be the primary focus of testing. Although RSA is not the 
best candidate for practical implementation (see Testing 
Results), it is still of use due to its mathematical properties. 
Regarding integrity code generation, given in [3]: 
The data owner generates all the integrity codes, one 
for each data item (i.e., each attribute value T.A(e)), 
where T.A(e) is the value of an attribute A in a table T 
for an entity (i.e., a row) e. The integrity code 
IC(T.A(e)) for a data item T.A(e) is a pair of quantities 
as described in the following equation.4 
 IC(T.A(e)) = SIG[s × T.A × T.A(e) × T.K(e)] + s (1) 
where × means multiplication, the symbol + means 
concatenation, s is the unique serial number assigned 
to the code, T.A is the name of the attribute A, T.K(e) 
is the entity e’s key value in the table T , and SIG[x] 
means the data owner’s RSA signature on x. The 
integrity code constructed by the above equation is an 
unforgeable code that attaches the attribute value 
T.A(e) to its owner entity e together. Without knowing 
the data owner’s RSA private key, nobody except the 
data owner is able to generate a valid signature (or 
integrity code) on the data [3]. 
Using this construction, the data owner is able to create an 
integrity code for each and every field in the table, which 
contains the attribute, attribute name, primary key, and serial 
number. To verify correctness, this signature can be regenerated 
and compared with the stored integrity code. It does not need to 
be decrypted for verification. 
The serial number mentioned earlier is required for 
freshness. The data owner must keep an Integrity Code 
Revocation List (ICRL), a list containing the range of serial 
numbers that are valid. If the data owner updates a table, the 
serial numbers corresponding to the fields that were removed 
should be listed in the ICRL file. This serial number will be used 
in testing for all cryptographic schemes in order to maintain data 
freshness. 
B. Cyrptographic Hashing 
Cryptographic hashing is the process of taking an input 
through a function and producing an output such that it is 
incredibly difficult to determine the input based on the output. It 
is commonly used in password verification schemes, and can 
also be used to verify data integrity (e.g., ensuring a file is not 
corrupted) [12]. 
A hash function can produce a fixed-length output hash 
based on an input of any size, making it an ideal candidate for 
low memory consumption and high performance. A potential 
downside is that data cannot be recovered from the output hash, 
which makes verifying individual contents infeasible. If a piece 
of data does not match its hash, it is not possible to determine 
what part of the data is incorrect from the hash alone. An 
integrity code can be generated in the same manner as RSA, 
except that SIG[x] here is a hash function, and the parameters 
can be concatenated instead of multiplied. 
C. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
AES is a symmetric-key encryption standard that uses a 
block-cipher for encrypting data. Using a single key for 
encryption and decryption, the resulting ciphertext can grow in 
size to accommodate more data [13]. Like RSA, its size must be 
greater than or equal to the original data size if decryption is 
desired. This means that using AES (or RSA), the size of an 
ICDB must be at least double the size of the corresponding 
standard database. 
 AES has the advantage of being fast to calculate and 
relatively low on memory usage. The main advantage is that 
verification of individual contents is possible, with potential 
recovery of corrupted data. The next section will show how AES 
can be used to verify data contents. 
IV. ICDB MODELS 
We have implemented two models (methods) of creating 
integrity codes. They specify what amount data in specific will 
be stored in an integrity code, which in turn identifies how many 
integrity codes there will be. 
A. One Code per Field (OCF) 
The OCF model specifies that for every data attribute, there 
must exist a corresponding integrity code attribute. In other 
words, for every field containing user data in a table, there must 
also exist a corresponding integrity code for that data field. The 
following table illustrates this implementation: 
TABLE I.  OCF TABLE STRUCTURE 
First_Name First_Name_IC Last_Name Last_Name_IC 
George IC1(George) Smith IC1(Smith) 
Ben IC2(Ben) Black IC2(Black) 
Bob IC3(Bob) Martinez IC3(Martinez) 
  
This model allows for a fine-grained control over the data. If 
a data field does not match its integrity code, the data owner 
knows that the field is invalid. Data being returned is simply all 
the data fields along with their integrity codes. If the data owner 
wants to query for the first name Ben, the integrity code IC(Ben) 
will also be returned. 
This approach is the one that is adopted from Yeh’s RSA 
model. For testing, both RSA and hashing will use this model. 
B. One Code per Tuple (OCT) 
When testing the OCF implementation, results have 
indicated that the average ratio between an integrity code and its 
corresponding data field is extremely high, even for hashing (see 
Testing Results). The problem is that data fields usually hold 
only a small amount of data. A tuple with the attribute 
First_Name can contain the field, George, which is only 6 
characters (48 bits) long. Compare that with an integrity code 
 which are usually recommended to have a minimum of 128 bits 
to be safe from code forgery. Thus, the integrity codes will most 
often be much larger than the actual data which they verify. 
We have proposed another method of storing integrity codes 
by using the OCT approach. Instead of generating an integrity 
code for each and every field, an integrity code will be generated 
for every tuple (row). This would not only limit the amount of 
extra fields to store in the database to one per tuple instead of 
one per field, it would also greatly reduce the integrity code to 
data ratio. A tuple can contain multiple fields, so the data will be 
larger, and therefore in many cases will surpass the 128-bit 
minimum threshold. 
To generate an integrity code for an entire tuple, the data 
owner can concatenate all the data and calculate the signature 
through a function (denoted SIG[x]): 
 IC(T) = SIG[A1 + A2 + … + An + s] (2) 
where T is the tuple, + is delimited concatenation, A1 … An are 
all the attributes in T, and s is the unique serial number assigned 
to the integrity code. Then we generate a signature using some 
encryption scheme. This signature can be verified to be correct 
either by decrypting the signature and obtaining the original data 
(in encryption such as AES), or by encrypting/hashing to this 
signature and comparing the generated signature to the one 
stored in the database. For easier retrieval, the serial number can 
be stored next to the integrity code in another column. 
TABLE II.  OCT TABLE STRUCTURE 
First_Name Last_Name Serial IC 
George Smith 1234 IC1(George, Smith, 1234) 
Ben Black 1235 IC2(Ben, Black, 1235) 
Bob Martinez 1236 IC3(Bob, Martinez, 1236) 
 
Hashing is the best option for memory consumption, since it 
can produce a fixed-size 128-bit output. However, it is not 
possible to determine what part of the data is incorrect, only that 
the tuple is incorrect. Comparing signatures alone will not be 
enough to verify individual contents, but only whether or not the 
entire row is correct.  Using encryption/decryption, it is possible 
to decrypt the integrity code and find out which parts of 
attributes are incorrect. The difference is that decrypting the 
signature enables checking of individual contents (and hence 
individual fields) and verifying the correctness of each. 
Additionally, if the original data cannot be recovered from the 
integrity code, it is necessary to return all the data in the tuple to 
regenerate a signature to verify the integrity code. However, if it 
can be recovered, it is only necessary to return the integrity code, 
decrypt it, and compare the decrypted data with the returned 
fields. 
 AES is the most attractive of the three in this case. Although 
the integrity code will be at least as large as the data in the tuple, 
unlike hashing, the integrity code never needs to be recalculated 
for verification. The integrity code can simply be decrypted and 
compared against the original data. No additional data needs to 
be returned, other than the integrity code itself. In short, hashing 
provides the best memory usage at fixed-length, but requires 
more data to be returned, decreasing performance. AES may 
require more memory, but other than the integrity code, does not 
need to return additional data for verification, and in some cases 
may require less data returned than hashing. 
 In this case we have only implemented AES to work with 
OCT, but hashing is also possible. This document will explore 
the results of using both OCF and OCT ICDB model 
implementations. Due to time restrictions, our research only 
covers three of the six possible ICDB implementations: RSA 
OCF, hashing OCF, and AES OCT. 
V. TESTING PROCESS 
A. Hardware and Software Used 
All implementation, testing, and benchmarking was 
performed on Boise State University’s Onyx server at 
onyx.boisestate.edu (See Appendix for specifications). MySQL 
(MariaDB) was used as the underlying database management 
system for storing data and executing queries. MySQL 
Workbench, as well as MySQLSlap were used for performing 
benchmarks, configured with InnoDB as the database engine 
and UTF-8 as the character encoding. For database and query 
conversion, along with query verification, we implemented our 
own modules using Java SE 1.8. 
The three database schemas used for all of our testing are 
publically available online: World (InnoDB) [7], Sakila [8], and 
Employees (v1.0.6) [9]. They vary in size from 0.8, 7, and 200 
MiB respectively. These schemas are basic examples of 
databases that one can encounter. For example, Employees holds 
data such as employee information, department numbers, and 
department locations. Before each test, the databases were 
returned to their original state to reduce additional variables. 
There are ICDB implementations that were tested: RSA 
OCF, Hashing OCF, and AES OCT. Each implementation will 
be referred to their respective encryption scheme hence forward 
(RSA, hashing, AES). RSA uses a 1024-bit (fixed size) output 
for all integrity codes. Hashing uses PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1 
(Java) as its underlying hash function with a  24-byte hash and 
salt (384 bits total) using 10 hash iterations. AES used ECB 
(Java) as its implementation. Other implementation modes are 
possible, but have not been tested. 
B. Conversion Process 
Our data conversion process is implemented using a MySQL 
procedure and a few Java Modules. The implementation is given 
below. 
1) Schema Conversion 
The beginning assumption is that the data owner either has a 
pre-existing database with data they wish to protect, or the 
necessary files to create the database. A duplicate schema is 
created using a schema file. In this implementation, we executed 
the following query, once for each column in each table in the 
new database (OCF): 
ALTER TABLE table_name 
ADD COLUMN CONCAT(column_name, '_IC') 
TEXT NOT NULL AFTER column_name; 
 where table_name is the name of a table, and column_name is 
the name of an attribute within the table (e.g. First_Name). This 
query inserts a new integrity code attribute after a column (e.g. 
First_Name_IC). It is possible to create a dynamic SQL 
procedure to go through all columns in every table to generate 
an integrity code attribute alongside every data attribute. OCT is 
similar, except that only 1-2 (Serial/IC) columns need to be 
inserted into every table. 
2) Data Conversion 
Once the schema is converted to an ICDB, the data needs to 
be converted and inserted in the ICDB. Another assumption is 
that the data is in some kind of file (text in this case) separated 
by a delimiter. The data owner can do this by executing the 
following query for each table in the database that contains the 
data to be converted: 
SELECT * INTO OUTFILE file_path 
FIELDS DELIMITED BY ‘|’ 
LINES TERMINATED BY ‘\n’ 
FROM table_name; 
where file_path is the pathname of the file that the data will be 
dumped to. We have created a Java module that will parse the 
file and automatically generate integrity codes for each field, and 
create both the ICRL file and the key file to be kept by the data 
owner.  Once that is done, it is a simple case of loading the data 
files into the new ICDB. It can be executed, once for each table, 
with the query: 
LOAD DATA INFILE file_path 
REPLACE INTO TABLE table_name 
FIELDS TERMINATED BY '|' 
LINES TERMINATED BY '\n'; 
This query is used to load all data in existing tables one by one. 
With that accomplished, the ICDB is ready to accept ICDB 
queries. 
3) Query Conversion 
A standard query is not sufficient for data verification. The 
query needs to be converted to return not only the requested data 
but also the corresponding integrity codes to maintain 
correctness and freshness. The integrity codes of each field, 
keys, and attribute names all need to be returned in order to 
properly regenerate the integrity code. 
Dr. Yeh explains OCF query conversion: 
 Input (an SQL query): 
SELECT A1, A2, ... Ar  
FROM T1, T2, ... Tm  
WHERE C1 and/or ... Cn 
 Output (an ICDB query): 
SELECT A1, ... Ar , K1, ... Km, B1, ... Bk, 
 IC(A1), ... IC(Ar), IC(B1), ... IC(Bk) 
FROM T1, T2, ... Tm 
WHERE C1 and/or ... Cn 
where A1…Ar are attribute names, K1…Km are key 
attribute names for tables T1…Tm respectively, B1…Bk are 
attribute names that appear in the conditions C1…Cn 
within the WHERE clause, and finally are those 
attributes injected for associated integrity codes, one for 
each of the attributes A1…Ar , B1…Bk respectively [3]. 
An example of OCF query conversion is given. 
We use two example SQL queries over the “company” 
database to demonstrate how to apply the above query 
conversion algorithm. 
Query 1 - “Retrieve the last names of employees who 
works for department 5”: The original SQL query for 
Query 1 is 
SELECT lname  
FROM employee  
WHERE dno = 5; 
Applying the query conversion algorithm, the 
corresponding ICDB query is  
 SELECT lname, ssn, dno, IC(lname), IC(dno) 
FROM employee  
 // This employee table is a redefined 
 // table in the ICDB schema containing 
 // injected integrity code attributes 
 WHERE dno = 5; [3] 
OCT query conversion is as follows. 
Input (SQL query): 
SELECT A1, A2, ... Ar  
FROM T1, T2, ... Tm  
WHERE C1 and/or ... Cn 
Output (ICDB query): 
SELECT A1, ... Ar , B1, ... Bk, IC1, ... ICm, 
FROM T1, T2, ... Tm 
WHERE C1 and/or ... Cn 
where A1…Ar are attribute names for tables T1…Tm respectively, 
B1…Bk are attribute names that appear in the conditions C1…Cn 
within the WHERE clause, and IC1 … ICm are the integrity codes 
in tables T1…Tm respectively. The difference between OCF and 
OCT is that only the integrity codes in a table column need to be 
returned, instead of the integrity codes for each and every 
attribute within a table. 
 An example of OCT query conversion is given. The query 
SELECT lname  
FROM employee  
WHERE dno = 5; 
will be converted to  
SELECT lname, dno, IC 
FROM employee  
WHERE dno = 5; 
 The only additional data required here is dno and IC, in order 
to verify that dno is indeed 5, and that the IC will match against 
lname and dno. 
VI. TESTING RESULTS 
As mentioned in the Introduction, our criteria for evaluation 
are: verification, memory usage, and data conversion/retrieval 
time. The following sections show the results of each criterion 
 evaluated on a standard database and its converted ICDB 
counterpart. The results are neither exhaustive nor complete, but 
do provide useful preliminary information about ICDB 
performance. 
A. Verification 
If an ICDB cannot verify the validity of data, then there is no 
advantage of using it over a standard database. As such, it is the 
foremost priority to test whether or not an ICDB will detect 
various kinds of malicious attacks. The following attacks have 
been tested. 
1) Forgery Attack 
A forgery attack is an attack that mutates or alters fields in a 
database. This could involve either the manipulation of the data 
field itself, or its integrity code. 
From the table Country, we modified the attribute “Name” 
of a few entries and were able to detect the changes in each 
modified field, marked as invalid. Likewise, if we altered the 
integrity codes for those fields, it would also show up as invalid. 
2) Substitution Attack 
A substitution attack modifies fields by substituting them 
with other existing fields within the database. This could include 
copying and replacing a field somewhere else, moving data 
around, or swapping data from the same row/column. 
In the Country table, swapping fields with attributes such as 
“Continent” and “Region” resulted in those swapped entries to 
be invalid. If both the data field and integrity code were swapped 
with another data field and integrity code within the same row, 
we were also able to detect those changes. So data/ICs swapped 
within the same row/column is able to be detected, along with 
fields copied over another field. 
3) Old Data Attack 
An old data attack will return correct data (with its integrity 
code) that was previously stored in the database which has been 
replaced or deleted. 
In the City table, removing a row updated the ICRL file 
accordingly, to flag the corresponding serial numbers as invalid. 
When trying to return the old data in a SELECT query, 
verification failed, so those changes were detected. 
4) Tuple Insertion/ Deletion Attack 
A tuple insertion attack introduces new rows in the database. 
This could be a new piece of data, a row containing data copies 
from other rows, or a complete duplicate of another row. 
Without knowing the keys used for encryption, generating a 
new tuple would not contain correct integrity codes. We were 
able to verify this in the Country table by inserting new data. 
Duplicating a tuple is theoretically possible to be undetected by 
verification, but MySQL prevents tables from having duplicate 
key values, making duplicate tuples impossible unless the 
primary key checks were disabled. 
A tuple deletion attack removes existing tuples from the 
database. The verification module was unable to detect deletions 
from the City table. These integrity codes are unable to verify 
completeness, so tuple deletions will remain undetected. 
B. Memory Usage 
The first benchmark that was performed was measuring 
memory usage in databases. We analyzed the size of a standard 
DB, along the size of a converted ICDB with the same basic 
information, with integrity codes inserted.  We also analyzed 
sizes for some of the tables within each database. 
Below, the first chart displays the size increase between DBs 
and their ICDB counterparts using AES, Hashing, and RSA 
ICDB schemes respectively. 
DATABASE SIZES (MIB) 
 
Fig. 1. Database size relationships between three databases. This chart uses a 
logarithmic base 2 scale to better show database proportions, measured in 
Mibibytes. RSA data for Employees is not available due to the database 
conversion taking too long. 
Based on the data, the increase in size is quite consistent 
from database to database. Note that this chart uses a logarithmic 
(base 2) scale, therefore every gridline is double the size of the 
previous. On average, database sizes increase by approximately 
2.5x, 9x, and 23x through AES, Hashing, and RSA respectively. 
AES resulted in the least amount of memory used, while RSA 
resulted in the most. 
DATABASE SIZES (MIB) 
 
Fig. 2. Database table size relationships in a stacked column layout. Each 
color represents a table within the database. Larger tables are stacked on top. 
This chart uses a linear scale measured in Mibibytes. 
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 The second chart shows the individual table sizes within the 
Sakila database, and reveals how much each table has grown 
from using AES, Hashing, and RSA. 
Again, there is a clear progression in size. The tables 
increased on average 2.6x, 10x, and 25x for AES, Hashing, and 
RSA respectively. This result is slightly more than the actual 
database sizes, due to the additional database overhead. 
C. Data Conversion Time 
The next benchmark involved the time required to convert 
all the data in a standard database to an ICDB. This process 
involved reading the data file dump attribute for attribute, 
generating an integrity code based on one or more attributes and 
copying them in a new ICDB data file. This file can then be read 
by MySQL and inserted into an ICDB. The time measured in the 
following chart is the time for converting all data files in a 
database. 
DATABASE CONVERSION TIME (S) 
 
Fig. 3. Database conversion time relationships measured in seconds. 
Logarithmic base 10 scale. RSA data for Employees is not available due to the 
database conversion taking too long. 
From the chart, AES converted the quickest, hashing was in 
the middle, while RSA took a long time to convert. Although 
Employees RSA data is unavailable, we predict that conversion 
would take at least 18 hours. The results in this section also give 
some indication as to the increase in time required for ICDB 
queries, as codes will be need to be regenerated or verified when 
the database is in use. 
D. Query Execution, Retrieval and Verification Time 
The retrieval speeds of common MySQL queries were 
analyzed and the results of each query were compared in both 
the DB and ICDB implementations. Due to difficulty in 
implementing robust parsing and some time-consuming 
debugging, we only have a limited set of results regarding query 
conversion and verification. However, these results do provide 
some good indication of performance penalties for ICDBs. Each 
of these queries were tested over 100-1000 iterations and 
averaged to reduce variability. 
The next tests performed involved SELECT * queries to 
measure the amount of time it takes to return all data in a table. 
MySQLSlap was used to execute a large number of SELECT * 
queries on each table in a database, the results from which were 
averaged. The following chart shows the ratio of the average 
time increase executing the queries using our different schemes. 
SELECT * EFFICIENCY (EXPERIMENTAL / BASELINE) 
 
Fig. 4. Database SELECT * time execution ratios, using linear scale. RSA 
data for Employees is not available due to the database conversion taking too 
long. 
The measurement is the ratio ICDB / DB query execution 
time. The chart shows that AES executed the queries in the least 
time, at 1.74x the original time in the World database, while 
RSA executed for the most time, at 4.86x. According to the 
tables there is a considerable performance penalty for retrieving 
data, especially for RSA. 
Additional results for SELECT, DELETE, and INSERT 
queries are given below. Due to time constraints, only queries 
were only tested with RSA on the World database. The 
following chart shows the increase in time required to convert a 
SELECT query and retrieve the requested data. Queries Q1-Q8 
are given in the Appendix. Here, “execution” measures both the 
carrying out of the query and the data retrieval for the query. 
SELECT QUERY CONVERSION, RETRIEVAL, AND VERIFICATION TIME (MS) 
 
Fig. 5. Database SELECT query execution/retrieval time in blue, and ICDB 
(RSA) query conversion, execution/retrieval, and verification time in orange, 
gray, and yellow respectively. Using logarithmic base 10 scale. 
This chart compares the execution time of a SELECT query 
executed on a DB with the same query converted, executed, and 
verified on an RSA ICDB. The stacked column illustrates the 
total execution time required to complete all parts. Query 
conversion is the fastest, and is almost negligible. On average, 
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 retrieval takes 2x as long with ICDB data (with ICs) than with 
DB data. On average, ICDB verification takes 40,000x more 
time than DB execution/retrieval time. This means that 
verification dwarfs conversion/execution by taking the vast 
majority of the time to execute, and will impact performance 
significantly. 
Results for DELETE queries are given in the chart below.  
Note that before any data is to be deleted, the data should be 
requested with a select query and be verified. This is to ensure 
that the data was not modified in any way. However, this is not 
absolutely necessary, as the modified data would not be used 
after it is deleted anyway. Once that is done, the ICRL file must 
be updated to revoke the deleted serial numbers. Queries Q1-Q9 
are given in the Appendix. 
DELETE QUERY EXECUTION TIME (MS) 
 
Fig. 6. Database DELETE query execution time in blue, and ICDB (RSA) data 
verification, query execution, and ICRL update in yellow, gray, and orange 
respectively. Using logarithmic base 10 scale. 
This chart compares the execution time of a DELETE query 
executed on a DB with the same query verified, executed, and 
updated on an RSA ICDB. ICDB execution and ICRL updating 
takes on average 2x more time than standard DB execution. 
Verification takes the majority of the time, with a 10,000x 
average increase. 
Results for INSERT queries are given below. 
INSERT QUERY EXECUTION TIME (MS) 
 
Fig. 7. Database INSERT query execution time in blue, and ICDB (RSA) 
query execution and conversion in orange and gray respectively. Using 
logarithmic base 10 scale. 
This chart compares the execution of an INSERT statement 
with the conversion and execution of the ICDB statement. ICDB 
execution on average took 1.7x more time than DB execution, 
and ICDB conversion took the bulk of the time, with 130x more 
time. This result is far less than verification, but still requires a 
fair amount of additional time to convert each query. 
VII. THREATS TO VALIDITY 
Although the benchmarks used for evaluation provide some 
level of understanding in regard to database performance, they 
are not exhaustive. There are numerous benchmark standards by 
which our experiment’s databases could have been evaluated. 
Highly specified tests could be conducted separately, for 
specific cases which did not fall within the primary focus of this 
project. Along with this we only ran benchmarks on a MySQL 
database, and did not test other database options, such as SQLite 
or Microsoft SQL. 
Secondly, the benchmarks were ran a diverse set of 
databases of differing sizes, however there were limits to the size 
of the databases we could create and as such we did not test 
databases with sizes larger than 200 MiB. Results RSA in the 
Employees database do not exist because conversion would have 
taken 18+ hours. This makes the data slightly inconsistent. 
Additionally, only three of the six possible ICDB model 
implementations (RSA OCF, hashing OCF, AES OCT), have 
been tested. Due to time constraints, RSA OCT, hashing OCT, 
and AES OCF have not been tested. This does not give a 
complete picture of how the cryptographic algorithms fare 
overall in ICDBs. Instead, it offers an indication of possible 
performance gains using certain implementation models over 
others. 
Thirdly, the ICDB implementations were based on the 
algorithms explained by Dr. Yeh in his own database research. 
These may not necessarily be the most effective or sound 
algorithms by which to generate integrity codes, which is the 
reason why additional ICDB models are discussed in this 
document. It is probable that a more robust or efficient algorithm 
exists which may provide fewer performance penalties. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
From the data, there are many different penalties that are 
required to run an ICDB over a normal DB. It requires more 
drive memory to store the ICDB, and more time to return data 
required for integrity code creation or verification. More 
memory is required because codes are required to be stored 
along with each table attribute. More time is required to convert 
the DB, convert MySQL queries, retrieve data along with their 
integrity codes, and verify the data, due to more information 
being required for each query. The goal, then, should be to 
mitigate this memory and performance penalty as much as 
possible while not compromising database integrity verification. 
The simplest approach would be to reduce the sizes of stored 
integrity codes as much as possible. 
An ICDB implementation should allow for secure and 
certain detection of data. Our implementations were able to 
detect Forgery, Substitution, and Old Data Attacks and report 
which fields were invalid. The only type of attack that we tested 
that was not able to detect changes was the Tuple Deletion 
Attack, where an attacker could delete existing tuples, or the 
30 s 26 s
6 s 9 s
1.2 m
4.5 s
1.3 m 1.3 m
7 m
1
10
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
1,000,000
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
m
s
DB Execution ICRL Update ICDB Execution ICDB Verification
0
1
10
100
1,000
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
m
s
DB Execution ICDB Execution ICDB Conversion
 cloud provider does not return all of the data within the database. 
In order to detect this attack, enforcement of data completeness 
is necessary (which is not enforced in this implementation for 
simplicity, as explained in the Introduction). 
The three approaches used are compared here. 
A. RSA (OCF) 
1) Alows for decryption and verification of content 
2) Massive database size increases 
3) Slow to convert 
4) Poor query speed 
B. Hashing (OCF) 
1) Alows for verification of content 
2) Size is fixed and relatively small 
3) Quick to convert 
4) Good query speed 
C. AES (OCT) 
1) Alows for decryption and verification of content 
2) Size grows with data and is relatively small 
3) Very quick to convert 
4) Great query speed 
 
RSA (OCF) is too impractical for large databases. The 
increase in size (about 25x), along with the slow conversion and 
verification times indicate that performance will be poor. 
Hashing (OCF) provides the same functionality as RSA, with a 
much smaller overhead requirement. The hash could be reduced 
in size further to increase performance. AES (OCT) provided the 
fastest and smallest implementation. It is the most practical out 
of the three, due to its compact representation of codes and quick 
conversion. It appears that OCT is much more efficient than 
OCF, due to the smaller amount of data required to return (as 
explained in section IV, ICDB Models). There are tradeoffs to 
both approaches. 
For specific (non-SELECT *) queries, the only data 
available is with RSA. One important piece of information is 
that, in an ICDB, most of the time will be spent verifying the 
information. Databases can return large amounts of data very 
quickly, and as such, requesting more information will not 
dramatically reduce performance. The large bottleneck occurs 
when the requested data needs to be verified. This is a process 
that involves looping through every data field/tuple, which can 
take considerably longer. Performance can be improved 
significantly by making this operation parallel, as both integrity 
code generation and verification does not rely on the generation 
or verification of any other integrity codes. Nevertheless, 
performing some calculation on the data will still require more 
resources than simply returning the data. In RSA, the 
performance penalty is massive, but with other encryption 
schemes, this could be reduced considerably. 
Our data is by no means comprehensive, and there are still 
many tests that can be performed, along with additional database 
schemes. The data that is here does provide the extent to which 
an ICDB could impact performance. Some implementations, 
such as RSA, could be too costly to the average user. It is 
necessary to mitigate impact on performance as much as 
possible while ensuring that malicious attacks can be detected.  
From the results of ICDBs that have been tested, using an 
ICDB in a real-world scenario is feasible, as long as the data 
owner acknowledges the performance penalties required to 
maintain data integrity. The results have shown that ICDBs can 
be light and fast while still maintaining data correctness and 
freshness. There is much more data to glean from ICDBs than 
what this document has provided. Going further, it is suggested 
to explore more types of ICDB models, and additionally, 
perform more detailed testing. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Hardware Specifications 
All tests were performed on Onyx. Onyx is Boise State 
University’s Linux server provided for students and faculty, 
accessible through onyx.boisestate.edu. The specifications are 
provided below. 
Architecture:          x86_64 
CPU op-mode(s):        32-bit, 64-bit 
Byte Order:            Little Endian 
CPU(s):                24 
CPU(s) list:   0-23 
Thread(s) per core:    2 
Core(s) per socket:    6 
Socket(s):             2 
NUMA node(s):          2 
Vendor ID:             GenuineIntel 
CPU family:            6 
Model:                 62 
Model name:            Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v2 
@ 2.60GHz 
Stepping:              4 
CPU MHz:               1453.156 
CPU max MHz:           3100.0000 
CPU min MHz:           1200.0000 
BogoMIPS:              5205.36 
Virtualization:        VT-x 
L1d cache:             32K 
L1i cache:             32K 
L2 cache:              256K 
L3 cache:              15360K 
NUMA node0 CPU(s): 0,2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16,18,20,22 
NUMA node1 CPU(s): 1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15,17,19,21,23 
 
B. Queries Used 
The following are the SELECT queries (Q1-Q8) used for the 
data in Fig. 5. Note that this particular implementation used the 
“_SVC” suffix instead of “_IC”. 
DB: 
1. SELECT * FROM City; 
2. SELECT DISTINCT ID, Name, Population FROM City WHERE 
`CountryCode`='NLD'; 
3. SELECT Code, Name, Region FROM Country; 
4. SELECT ID, Name, District FROM City WHERE `ID`<'250'; 
5. SELECT * FROM CountryLanguage WHERE `Language`='English' 
OR (`Language`='Spanish' AND `IsOfficial`='T'); 
6. SELECT * FROM Country; 
7. SELECT * FROM CountryLanguage; 
8. SELECT Country.Name, Country.Continent, 
Country.Population, City.Name, City.Population FROM 
Country INNER JOIN City ON Country.Code=City.CountryCode; 
ICDB: 
1. SELECT ID, ID_SVC, NAME, NAME_SVC, COUNTRYCODE, 
COUNTRYCODE_SVC,DISTRICT, DISTRICT_SVC, POPULATION, 
POPULATION_SVC FROM CITY; 
2. SELECT DISTINCT ID, ID_SVC, NAME, NAME_SVC, POPULATION, 
POPULATION_SVC FROM CITY WHERE `COUNTRYCODE`='NLD'; 
3. SELECT CODE, CODE_SVC, NAME, NAME_SVC, REGION, REGION_SVC 
FROM COUNTRY; 
4. SELECT ID, ID_SVC, NAME, NAME_SVC, DISTRICT, DISTRICT_SVC 
FROM CITY WHERE `ID`<'250';" 
5. SELECT COUNTRYCODE, COUNTRYCODE_SVC, LANGUAGE, 
LANGUAGE_SVC, ISOFFICIAL, ISOFFICIAL_SVC, PERCENTAGE, 
PERCENTAGE_SVC FROM COUNTRYLANGUAGE WHERE 
`LANGUAGE`='English' OR (`LANGUAGE`='Spanish' AND 
`ISOFFICIAL`='T');" 
6. SELECT CODE, CODE_SVC, NAME, NAME_SVC, CONTINENT, 
CONTINENT_SVC, REGION, REGION_SVC, SURFACEAREA, 
SURFACEAREA_SVC, INDEPYEAR, INDEPYEAR_SVC, POPULATION, 
POPULATION_SVC, LIFEEXPECTANCY, LIFEEXPECTANCY_SVC, GNP, 
GNP_SVC, GNPOLD, GNPOLD_SVC, LOCALNAME, LOCALNAME_SVC, 
GOVERNMENTFORM, GOVERNMENTFORM_SVC, HEADOFSTATE, 
HEADOFSTATE_SVC, CAPITAL, CAPITAL_SVC, CODE2, CODE2_SVC 
FROM COUNTRY; 
7. SELECT COUNTRYCODE, COUNTRYCODE_SVC, LANGUAGE, 
LANGUAGE_SVC, ISOFFICIAL, ISOFFICIAL_SVC, PERCENTAGE, 
PERCENTAGE_SVC FROM COUNTRYLANGUAGE; 
8. SELECT COUNTRY.NAME, COUNTRY.NAME_SVC, COUNTRY.CONTINENT, 
COUNTRY.CONTINENT_SVC, COUNTRY.POPULATION, 
COUNTRY.POPULATION_SVC, CITY.NAME, CITY.NAME_SVC, 
CITY.POPULATION, CITY.POPULATION_SVC, COUNTRY.CODE, 
CITY.ID FROM COUNTRY INNER JOIN CITY ON 
COUNTRY.CODE=CITY.COUNTRYCODE; 
The following are the DELETE queries (Q1-Q9) used for the 
data in Fig. 6. 
DB: 
1. DELETE FROM `Country` WHERE `Continent`='Asia' OR 
`Continent`='Europe'; 
2. DELETE FROM `Country` WHERE `IndepYear`<'1950'; 
3. DELETE FROM `City` WHERE `CountryCode`='ESP'; 
4. DELETE FROM `CountryLanguage` WHERE `IsOfficial`='T' AND 
`Percentage`<'50'; 
5. DELETE FROM `Country`; 
6. DELETE FROM `City` WHERE `Population`<'10000'; 
7. DELETE FROM `CountryLanguage`; 
8. DELETE FROM `CountryLanguage` WHERE `CountryCode`!='ABW' 
AND `CountryCode`!='AFG' AND `CountryCode`!='AGO'; 
9. DELETE FROM `City`; 
ICDB: 
1. SELECT CODE, CODE_SVC, NAME, NAME_SVC, CONTINENT, 
CONTINENT_SVC, REGION, REGION_SVC, SURFACEAREA, 
SURFACEAREA_SVC, INDEPYEAR, INDEPYEAR_SVC, POPULATION, 
POPULATION_SVC, LIFEEXPECTANCY, LIFEEXPECTANCY_SVC, GNP, 
GNP_SVC, GNPOLD, GNPOLD_SVC, LOCALNAME, LOCALNAME_SVC, 
GOVERNMENTFORM, GOVERNMENTFORM_SVC, HEADOFSTATE, 
HEADOFSTATE_SVC, CAPITAL, CAPITAL_SVC, CODE2, CODE2_SVC 
FROM COUNTRY WHERE `CONTINENT`='Asia' OR 
`CONTINENT`='Europe'; 
2. SELECT CODE, CODE_SVC, NAME, NAME_SVC, CONTINENT, 
CONTINENT_SVC, REGION, REGION_SVC, SURFACEAREA, 
SURFACEAREA_SVC, INDEPYEAR, INDEPYEAR_SVC, POPULATION, 
POPULATION_SVC, LIFEEXPECTANCY, LIFEEXPECTANCY_SVC, GNP, 
GNP_SVC, GNPOLD, GNPOLD_SVC, LOCALNAME, LOCALNAME_SVC, 
GOVERNMENTFORM, GOVERNMENTFORM_SVC, HEADOFSTATE, 
HEADOFSTATE_SVC, CAPITAL, CAPITAL_SVC, CODE2, CODE2_SVC 
FROM COUNTRY WHERE `INDEPYEAR`<'1950'; 
3. SELECT ID, ID_SVC, NAME, NAME_SVC, COUNTRYCODE, 
COUNTRYCODE_SVC, DISTRICT, DISTRICT_SVC, POPULATION, 
POPULATION_SVC FROM CITY WHERE `COUNTRYCODE`='ESP'; 
4. SELECT COUNTRYCODE, COUNTRYCODE_SVC, LANGUAGE, 
LANGUAGE_SVC, ISOFFICIAL, ISOFFICIAL_SVC, PERCENTAGE, 
PERCENTAGE_SVC FROM COUNTRYLANGUAGE WHERE 
`ISOFFICIAL`='T' AND `PERCENTAGE`<'50'; 
5. SELECT CODE, CODE_SVC, NAME, NAME_SVC, CONTINENT, 
CONTINENT_SVC, REGION, REGION_SVC, SURFACEAREA, 
SURFACEAREA_SVC, INDEPYEAR, INDEPYEAR_SVC, POPULATION, 
POPULATION_SVC, LIFEEXPECTANCY, LIFEEXPECTANCY_SVC, GNP, 
GNP_SVC, GNPOLD, GNPOLD_SVC, LOCALNAME, LOCALNAME_SVC, 
GOVERNMENTFORM, GOVERNMENTFORM_SVC, HEADOFSTATE, 
 HEADOFSTATE_SVC, CAPITAL, CAPITAL_SVC, CODE2, CODE2_SVC 
FROM COUNTRY; 
6. SELECT ID, ID_SVC, NAME, NAME_SVC, COUNTRYCODE, 
COUNTRYCODE_SVC, DISTRICT, DISTRICT_SVC, POPULATION, 
POPULATION_SVC FROM CITY WHERE `POPULATION`<'10000'; 
7. SELECT COUNTRYCODE, COUNTRYCODE_SVC, LANGUAGE, 
LANGUAGE_SVC, ISOFFICIAL, ISOFFICIAL_SVC, PERCENTAGE, 
PERCENTAGE_SVC FROM COUNTRYLANGUAGE; 
8. SELECT COUNTRYCODE, COUNTRYCODE_SVC, LANGUAGE, 
LANGUAGE_SVC, ISOFFICIAL, ISOFFICIAL_SVC, PERCENTAGE, 
PERCENTAGE_SVC FROM COUNTRYLANGUAGE WHERE 
`COUNTRYCODE`!='ABW' AND `COUNTRYCODE`!='AFG' AND 
`COUNTRYCODE`!='AGO'; 
9. SELECT ID, ID_SVC, NAME, NAME_SVC, COUNTRYCODE, 
COUNTRYCODE_SVC, DISTRICT, DISTRICT_SVC, POPULATION, 
POPULATION_SVC FROM CITY;" 
The following are the INSERT queries (Q1-Q6) used for the 
data in Fig. 7. 
DB: 
1. INSERT INTO `City` (ID, Name, CountryCode, District, 
Population) VALUES ('4080','Boise', 'USA', 'Idaho', 
'123456'); 
2. INSERT INTO `City` (ID, Name, CountryCode) VALUES 
('4080','Boise', 'USA'); 
3. INSERT INTO  `Country` (Code, Name, Continent, Region, 
SurfaceArea, IndepYear, Population, LifeExpectancy, GNP, 
GNPOld, LocalName VALUES ('TEX', 'Texas', 'North 
America', 'North America', '900000.00', '1900', 
'2790000', '25', '85128', '81111','Texas'); 
4. INSERT INTO  `Country` (Code, Region, IndepYear, 
LifeExpectancy, GNP, GNPOld, LocalName, GovernmentForm, 
HeadOfState) VALUES ('TEX', 'North America', '1900',  
'25', '85128', '81111','Texas', 'Monarchy','Dhali'); 
5. INSERT INTO  `CountryLanguage` (CountryCode, Language, 
IsOfficial, Percentage) VALUES 
('ZZZ','Viatnamese','F','100'); 
6. INSERT INTO  `CountryLanguage` (CountryCode, Language, 
IsOfficial) VALUES ('ZZZ','Viatnamese','F'); 
ICDB Queries are omitted because they were too large.
 
